

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090014-2

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATIONADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

|   |   |
|---|---|
| 2 | 5 |
| 3 | 6 |
| 4 | 7 |
|   | 8 |

BY: \_\_\_\_\_ AT: \_\_\_\_\_ Z

DISSEM BY 1W PER WPK

ACTION UNIT

JUN 21 15 26 Z72

TDCSD6-315/05524-72

FVS-30,109

ACTION

25X1

S E C R E T 210936Z JUN 72 INTEL

21 JUN IN 641798

CITE SAIGON 50663

DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

INTEL KOBIRD/VNO MHNONCE

SUPDATA [REDACTED]

OMITTED DUE OPERATIONAL INTEREST. BASED ON

[REDACTED] NO LIAISON PASSAGE. NO INDEX.

FILE: 201-320549. [REDACTED] PASS ALL AFTER

FILED TO PACOM (LIMIT DISTRIBUTION)

ELECTRICALLY.

FILED

210936Z

(F)SVN: Phoenix

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090014-2

SECRET



DIRECTORATE OF  
PLANS

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090014-2

ROUTINE

## Intelligence Information Cable

IN 641798

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

EXO DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

**SECRET**

CITE

DIST 21 JUNE 1972

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI LATE MAY - 15 JUNE 1972  
SUBJECT FACTORS INFLUENCING THE BIEN HOA PROVINCE NATIONAL  
POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH PROGRAM OF ARRESTING  
PERSONS SUSPECTED OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES

ACQ VIETNAM, BIEN HOA (15 JUNE 1972) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

A REGULAR

WHO WAS

AWARE HIS REMARKS WOULD REACH UNITED STATES  
OFFICIALS.

1. ON 15 JUNE 1972,

STATED THAT THE PROVINCE NATIONAL POLICE  
SPECIAL BRANCH HAD ARRESTED 95 PERSONS ON SUSPICION OF  
VIET CONG (VC) ACTIVITIES SINCE ITS VC ROLL-UP PROGRAM  
COMMENCED IN LATE MAY. SIXTEEN OF THE 95 HAVE BEEN  
BROUGHT BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOR TRIAL.

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090014-2

**SECRET**

IN 641798

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

25X1  
• **SECRET**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

25X1

OF THE 16, FIVE WERE FOUND GUILTY AND GIVEN THREE TO 24-MONTH PRISON SENTENCES; THE REMAINING 11 WERE FOUND NOT GUILTY AND RELEASED. ONLY ONE OF THE 95 ARRESTED HAS CONFESSED TO INVOLVEMENT IN VC ACTIVITIES.

25X1 2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE ARREST AND TRIAL RESULTS THUS FAR HAVE BEEN SHAMEFUL AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO. HE CITED TWO PRIMARY FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HE CONSIDERS THE COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH PROGRAM. THE FIRST IS THAT PRISONERS KNOW THAT THE POLICE CANNOT OBTAIN CONVICTIONS IN COURT WITHOUT SOLID EVIDENCE, AND IN LARGE SCALE ROLL-UP OPERATIONS SOLID EVIDENCE IS OBTAINED ONLY THROUGH INTERROGATION; THAT WITHOUT CONVICTIONS THOSE ARRESTED CAN BE HELD ONLY A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME; AND THAT IF THEY CONTINUE TO PROTEST THEIR INNOCENCE AND INTERROGATION RESULTS ARE NEGLIGIBLE THEY ARE RELEASED WITHIN 30 DAYS. THE SECOND FACTOR IS THAT IN MANY CASES PRISONERS HAVE RELATIVES OR FRIENDS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND POLITICAL HIERARCHIES IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE WHO CAN EASILY BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON LOCAL POLICE AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS; WITH SUFFICIENT PRESSURE IN THE RIGHT PLACES,

**SECRET**

IN 641798

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

25X1 SECRET

(classification)

(dissem controls)

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRISONERS OBTAIN SPEEDY TRIALS, AND, SINCE INVESTIGATORS  
USUALLY HAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THEIR INTERROGATIONS  
AND/OR INVESTIGATIONS, THE CASES ARE USUALLY DISMISSED FOR  
LACK OF EVIDENCE. [ ] COMMENT: DURING THE CONVERSATION

THE OFFICIAL SIGNED RELEASES FOR THREE OF THE REMAINING  
79 PRISONERS, ONE FOR AN APPARENTLY LEGITIMATE REASON AND TWO  
AS THE RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM HIS SUPERIORS.) THE [ ]

[ ] ADDED AS A THIRD FACTOR POOR TRAINING, LACK OF  
EXPERIENCE, AND LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM AMONG POLICE  
INVESTIGATORS AND INTERROGATORS.

3. THE BIEN HOA PROVINCE SECURITY COUNCIL IS COMPOSED  
OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: PROVINCE CHIEF LAM QUANG  
C H I N H, COUNCIL CHAIRMAN; PROSECUTING ATTORNEY T O N G  
OF THE BIEN HOA COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; SECTOR S2  
CHIEF MAJOR C H A U; MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE CHIEF MAJOR  
K I E N; NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF LIEUTENANT COLONEL TRAN VAN  
H A I; PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN P H U O C; AND INTERNAL  
SECURITY SERVICE CHIEF N H A M. ACCORDING TO THE [ ]

[ ], ATTORNEY TONG IS THE MOST POWERFUL MAN ON THE  
COUNCIL AND IS FEARED BY THE OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS AND BY

SECRET

IN 641798

25X1

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

25X1 SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

MOST PROVINCE OFFICIALS. IN THE ABSENCE OF PROVINCE CHIEF CHINH, TONG HAS ACTED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE TWO SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING HELD THUS FAR TO TRY THE PRISONERS, AND HAS SHOWN GREAT INTEREST IN OBTAINING RELEASES FOR SEVERAL OF THE 16 ALREADY TRIED. IN MOST CASES IT HAS BEEN HE WHO WAS CONTACTED BY RELATIVES AND FRIENDS OF THE PRISONERS. WHILE THE [ ] MADE NO DIRECT ACCUSATION OF BRIBERY OR COLLUSION AGAINST TONG, HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN AMONG THOSE "INFLUENCED" BY TONG TO REDUCE OR DROP CHARGES AND THAT THERE ARE WAYS OTHER THAN MONEY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON OFFICIALS.

25X1 4. THE [ ] CLAIMED THAT, LIKE MANY [ ]

25X1

[ ] HE IS POWERLESS TO COMBAT THE SYSTEM, SINCE HE HAS NO VOICE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MERELY PRESENTS THE CASES. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE HAS DELIBERATELY BEEN SLOWING THE LEGAL PROCESS BY HOLDING THE PRISONERS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BEFORE PRESENTING THEIR CASES TO THE COUNCIL. SINCE THE COUNCIL MEETS ONLY ONCE A WEEK, HE SAID, HE HAS BEEN PRESENTING "VERY SLOWLY" FIRST THOSE CASES IN WHICH THE MOST PRESSURE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO BEAR, THOSE IN WHICH

IN 641798

[REDACTED]

25X1

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

25X1 **SECRET** [REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

HE BELIEVES THE PRISONER TO BE INNOCENT, OR THOSE IN WHICH  
CONVICTION IS UNLIKELY IN ANY EVENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT:  
THE OFFICIAL IS WELL RESPECTED IN HIS POSITION BUT HE IS  
VERY DISCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH PROGRAM  
AND THE OUTSIDE PRESSURES BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE POLICE AND  
ON HIM, PERSONALLY.)

25X1

25X1 5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: SEE [REDACTED] MAY 1972, FOR

25X1  
25X1

A REPORT OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH  
OFFICIALS IN ARRESTING KNOWN OR SUSPECT VC IN TAY NINH  
PROVINCE. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR PROBLEMS IN THE PROGRAM IN  
THAT PROVINCE WAS GIVEN AS LACK OF COOPERATION OR OUTRIGHT  
OPPOSITION FROM VILLAGE, DISTRICT AND PROVINCE OFFICIALS.)

25X1 6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE PSD

25X1 [REDACTED] ONLY) AT SAIGON; SENT TO CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT  
PACAF PARIS. GROUP 1

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T [REDACTED]

25X1

**SECRET**